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FIRST LOOK
The OECD’s BEPS Project and Lower-Income Countries
by Michael C. Durst
Why the OECD? Institutional Setting of the 
BEPS Studies
In reviewing the OECD’s BEPS process as it 
relates to lower-income countries, it may be useful 
to begin with a question about global tax 
institutions: Why, as controversy arose over base 
erosion and profit shifting after the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, did the OECD assume leadership of the 
ensuing intergovernmental study of the topic, 
instead of a more inclusive international 
organization like the United Nations? The OECD’s 
membership consists of 35 industrialized and 
relatively wealthy countries,1 whereas the United 
Nations consists of 193 member states at all levels 
of wealth and economic development. Especially 
given that the fiscal consequences of BEPS-style 
tax planning, as discussed in Chapter 2, seem 
disproportionately severe for lower-income 
countries, why did the BEPS process originate 
under the auspices of an organization comprised 
of relatively wealthy countries?
Much of the reason is historical and has to do 
with events in the years immediately following 
World War II.2 As discussed in Chapter 3, after the 
First World War, the League of Nations took 
leadership of a global effort to draft a Model 
Income Tax Treaty, a task that involved 
articulating a standard pattern for countries to use 
in enacting their international tax laws. After the 
Second World War, however, the League of 
Nations dissolved and its successor, the newly 
formed United Nations, was slow to assume the 
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Copyright 2018 Michael C. Durst. All rights 
reserved.
1
OECD members as of this writing include Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Chile, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Latvia, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
2
See generally Michael J. McIntyre, “Developing Countries and 
International Cooperation on Income Tax Matters: An Historical 
Review,” unpublished manuscript (2005).
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League’s former work on model tax treaties. 
Instead, the Organization for European Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC), a group of sixteen Western 
European countries established to help 
administer post-War U.S. aid under the Marshall 
Plan, assumed the work of studying and 
reviewing the League’s Model Treaties. In 1960, 
the OEEC was succeeded by the OECD, with a 
membership extending beyond Europe, and the 
new organization continued the OEEC’s tax treaty 
work. In 1963, the OECD issued a new Model 
Income Tax Treaty, replacing the prior versions of 
the League, and since then the OECD, despite its 
relatively limited membership, has maintained 
the posture of primary global standards-setter in 
the design of international tax legislation.
In 1967, a group of developing countries, 
arguing that the international tax policy interests 
of capital-importing countries sometimes differ 
from those of capital-exporting countries like 
those in the OECD, initiated an effort at the 
United Nations to articulate a Model Income Tax 
Treaty parallel to the OECD’s. The work on a 
model tax treaty at the United Nations, unlike that 
at the OECD, was not designated as a formal 
collaborative process among sovereign 
governments. Instead, the U.N. process was to be 
conducted by a committee of government officials 
and other tax experts from twenty countries, who 
were to act only in their individual capacities. 
Decisions of the U.N. committee therefore could 
be seen only as informal recommendations of 
experts, not resolutions agreed to among U.N. 
member governments.
In 1980, the U.N. Tax Committee issued its 
own Model Income Tax Treaty for use between 
developed and developing countries. In overall 
format, the new U.N. model treaty paralleled the 
OECD model, but departed from it in ways 
intended to give developing-country 
governments greater leverage in their tax dealings 
with investing multinationals. For example, in its 
rules regarding “permanent establishments” — 
that is, rules governing when an investing 
multinational has a sufficiently extensive 
presence in a country to become liable to local 
taxation3 — the U.N. Model Treaty accorded 
countries greater power to tax investors than the 
OECD Model.4 With respect to central concepts, 
however, including notably the “arm’s-length 
principle” that governs rules for dividing a 
multinational group’s income among countries, 
the U.N. model treaty was virtually identical to 
that of the OECD. Since 1980, both the OECD and 
the U.N. have been engaged in ongoing processes 
of reviewing and incrementally updating their 
model treaties. The two model treaties continue to 
differ in details relating to the ability of “source” 
countries to tax inbound investors, while 
remaining consistent with each other on broad 
principles like the applicability of arm’s-length 
transfer pricing rules.5
The establishment of the U.N. Tax Committee, 
and the Committee’s issuance of its own Model 
Treaty, did not as a practical matter dent the 
OECD’s leading role in establishing global 
standards for international tax rules. The OECD 
has consistently maintained a much larger tax 
staff than the United Nations; it has extensive 
physical facilities based in Paris, for which the 
U.N. Tax Committee has no counterpart; and the 
OECD’s formal status as an intergovernmental 
organization gives its pronouncements and 
publications greater apparent weight of legal 
authority than documents generated by the U.N. 
Tax Committee.
In addition, for many years, the OECD has 
worked closely with international business 
representatives through its Business and Industry 
Advisory Committee (BIAC).6 Although BIAC has 
no formal decision-making role within the OECD, 
the OECD generally appears to try to reach a 
3
See text at note 72 below.
4
For a useful summary of differences between the OECD and U.N. 
model treaties, see Michael Lennard, “The UN Model Tax Convention as 
Compared With the OECD Model Tax Convention — Current Points of 
Difference and Recent Developments,” International Bureau of Fiscal 
Documentation Asia-Pacific Tax Bulletin (Jan./Feb. 2009).
5
The texts of the most recent versions of the OECD and U.N. Model 
Tax Conventions — extensive documents with lengthy official 
commentaries — are maintained on the websites of the two 
organizations.
In addition to the U.N. Model Treaty, an important U.N. Tax 
Committee document is the United Nations Practical Manual on 
Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries (2nd ed. 2017). The U.N. 
Manual contains detailed discussions of special administrative issues 
faced by developing countries in administering and enforcing transfer 
pricing rules, but does not challenge the primacy of the arm’s-length 
principle, as interpreted in the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
6
For a critical look at the OECD’s historical relationship with 
business interests, see Jesse Drucker, “OECD Enables Companies to 
Avoid $100 Billion in Taxes,” Bloomberg.com (Mar. 18, 2013).
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working accord with business interests when 
formulating its tax guidance. Therefore, the 
OECD’s guidelines in different areas of taxation 
are perceived by many in the global tax 
community as reflecting the results of quasi-
formal bargaining between global business 
interests and OECD member governments, a 
perception that affords the determinations of the 
OECD in tax matters additional international 
prestige.
As the controversy over corporate tax 
avoidance grew around the world following the 
2008 Crisis, some nongovernmental organizations 
criticized the notion of according the OECD 
leadership over a tax-reform study that would 
affect the interests of many countries that were 
not OECD members.7 These NGOs, supported by 
some developing-country governments, engaged 
in a global lobbying effort to upgrade the U.N. Tax 
Committee to an intergovernmental organization 
on a par with the OECD. This effort proved 
unsuccessful, but the argument that developing 
countries should be represented in the BEPS 
process was persuasive. Accordingly, from the 
outset of the BEPS effort, in late 2012, the OECD’s 
leadership made efforts to invite developing-
country governments to participate in its 
deliberations, in various ways.
During the initial stages of the BEPS analyses, 
in 2013 and 2014, the involvement of countries 
other than OECD members generally involved 
informal consultations among government 
officials from OECD member and nonmember 
countries, both at OECD headquarters in Paris 
and in regional conferences held around the 
world.8 Later, as the BEPS process was concluding 
and focus was turning to the implementation 
stage, the OECD invited all countries to 
participate formally in the BEPS process, on an 
equal footing with OECD members, in what the 
OECD named an “Inclusive Framework” for 
implementing BEPS, and about 100 countries 
have participated in meetings of the Framework.9
Developing-country governments generally 
have appeared eager to associate themselves with 
the OECD’s tax reform efforts through the 
Inclusive Framework and other institutional 
means of cooperation with the OECD. In my view, 
this reflects at least in part that developing-
country governments generally do not view 
themselves as engaged in zero-sum competition 
with either multinational companies or the 
governments of capital-exporting countries. It 
seems likely to me instead that most developing-
country governments perceive themselves as 
engaged in a continuous negotiation with the 
world’s multinationals, and with those 
companies’ home-country governments, to 
achieve politically and economically viable levels 
of corporate taxation on cross-border investment. 
The OECD has, by longstanding practice, 
established itself as an experienced forum for 
conducting this kind of negotiation. As a practical 
matter, therefore, whatever doubts might be 
expressed as to the appropriateness of the OECD 
as arbiter of global standards in corporate 
taxation, it seems likely that the OECD will 
continue to serve as the world’s primary locus of 
negotiation of those standards for the foreseeable 
future.
As will be discussed further in Chapter 6, this 
does not mean that the role of the U.N. Tax 
Committee, and especially its analytical 
resources, should not be enhanced. There are 
indeed ways in which the interests of OECD and 
U.N. member countries are likely systematically 
to differ, and forums should be provided to 
ensure that differing views are openly and 
thoroughly debated. No single institution should 
hold a monopoly over authoritative policy 
analysis in international taxation. But, especially 
if the Inclusive Framework proves to function 
effectively, the notion that the primary locus of 
negotiation in international tax matters should be 
7
For an account of NGOs’ arguments to this effect, see, e.g., Margaret 
Burow, “Developing Countries’ Options Limited in BEPS Discourse,” 
Tax Notes Int’l, Aug. 4, 2014, p. 365; and Stephanie Soong Johnston, “U.N. 
Rejects Global Tax Body,” Tax Notes Int’l, July 20, 2015, p. 195.
8
The OECD describes its efforts to engage developing-country 
governments in the BEPS process in its on-line discussion of Frequently 
Asked Questions on the BEPS process. It should be recognized as well 
that the initial political impetus for the BEPS process came not only from 
the OECD, but from the G-20 Group of countries, a group that includes 
Brazil, China, and India. See G-20, G-20 Leaders’ Declaration, St. 
Petersburg Summit (Sept. 6, 2013), paras. 50-52. From the initial stages of 
the BEPS process, Brazil, China, and India (as well as Mexico, which is 
an OECD member country) were included in negotiations as full 
participants, affording some degree of representation to countries that 
often are seen as “developing” (although their interests are likely to 
diverge from those of other developing countries with substantially 
lower per capita incomes).
9
See Stephanie Soong Johnston, “OECD Inclusive Framework 
Moving on BEPS Implementation,” Tax Notes Int’l, July 4, 2016, p. 32.
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shifted from the OECD to the United Nations 
seems, at least at the current time, politically 
unrealistic and potentially distracting from more 
important substantive matters.
Content of the OECD’s BEPS Studies: Overview
The OECD’s BEPS studies address fifteen 
“Action” items, each of which involves a difficult 
technical topic in international tax law.10 All fifteen 
Actions are important, in that they relate to areas 
of law that play some role in facilitating BEPS-
style corporate tax avoidance around the world. 
Some of the items addressed in the BEPS studies, 
however, are more important than others to the 
tax systems of lower-income countries. One of the 
OECD’s Action items, for example, involves 
sophisticated kinds of financial transactions 
(“hybrid mismatches”) that are likely to be of 
greatest interest to the tax administrations of 
wealthier countries; whereas other items involve 
fundamental principles of international tax law, 
like those governing transfer pricing, which are 
likely to be of interest to tax authorities in 
countries at all levels of wealth and economic 
development.
This chapter seeks to address, in a non-
technical manner, four topics covered by the BEPS 
report that are of special practical significance for 
lower-income countries. These include the 
OECD’s treatments of (i) transfer pricing rules; (ii) 
controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules; (iii) 
companies’ deductions of interest on loans from 
related parties; and (iv) income tax “treaty 
shopping.” Next, the chapter discusses some 
measures that relatively wealthy countries 
recently have taken, outside the boundaries of the 
BEPS recommendations, to protect their tax bases 
from erosion.
Transfer Pricing Rules Under the BEPS Studies
The New ‘Control of Risk’ Test
As described in Chapters 2 and 3, BEPS-style 
tax avoidance typically involves claims that 
members of multinational groups located in zero- 
or low-tax jurisdictions are bearing business risks 
on behalf of the group, and therefore should be 
treated as earning large portions of the group’s 
income, even though personnel of the zero- or 
low-tax affiliate may perform little or even no 
observable business activity. For example, zero- or 
low-tax affiliates that do nothing but contribute 
cash toward the development of a multinational 
group’s intellectual property historically have 
been treated as entitled to large portions of the 
group’s global income, typically by the receipt of 
royalties from other group members. Similarly, 
zero- or low-tax affiliates that simply receive cash 
from parent companies and re-lend that cash to 
other group members are treated as “really” 
bearing the risk of making the loans.
Even before the inception of the BEPS process, 
an OECD discussion draft on transfer pricing 
aspects of intangible property argued strongly 
that members of multinational groups should not 
be rewarded for supposedly bearing business 
risks associated with the ownership of intangibles 
if they performed no significant business 
functions other than contributing cash to the 
intangibles’ development.11 The discussion draft 
reported that the members of Working Party No. 
6, the group of national tax and finance officials 
who are responsible for transfer pricing analysis 
at the OECD, were:
uniformly of the view that transfer pricing 
outcomes in cases involving intangibles 
should reflect the functions performed, 
assets used, and risks assumed by the 
parties. This suggests that neither legal 
ownership, nor the bearing of costs related 
to intangible development, taken 
separately or together, entitles an entity 
within an MNE group to retain the 
10
The OECD organized its BEPS study around 15 “actions”: Action 1: 
Address the tax challenges of the digital economy; Action 2: Neutralise 
the effects of hybrid mismatch arrangements; Action 3: Strengthen CFC 
rules; Action 4: Limit base erosion via interest deductions and other 
financial payments; Action 5: Counter harmful tax practices more 
effectively, taking into account transparency and substance; Action 6: 
Prevent treaty abuse; Action 7: Prevent the artificial avoidance of PE 
status; Actions 8, 9, and 10: Assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in 
line with value creation; Action 11: Establish methodologies to collect 
and analyse data on BEPS and the actions to address it; Action 12: 
Require taxpayers to disclose their aggressive tax planning 
arrangements; Action 13: Re-examine transfer pricing documentation; 
Action 14: Make dispute resolution mechanisms more effective; and 
Action 15: Develop a multilateral instrument.
11
OECD, “Discussion Draft: Revision of the Special Considerations 
for Intangibles in Chapter VI of the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
and Related Provisions” (June 2012).
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benefits or returns with respect to 
intangibles without more.12
A few months later, an early public release of 
the OECD BEPS process extended the principle 
that transfer pricing rules should enforce a 
geographic correlation between an entity’s 
income and its value-creating functions, 
describing the BEPS process’s goal as “better 
aligning [countries’] rights to tax with real 
economic activity.”13 Soon afterward, in the BEPS 
Action Plan, the OECD similarly endorsed the 
goal of ensuring “that transfer pricing outcomes 
are in line with value creation.”14
Practitioners perceived the OECD’s intention 
as a substantial departure from existing transfer 
pricing rules, which generally rejected, as an 
unacceptably formulaic departure from the arm’s-
length principle, the notion of apportioning 
income among affiliates in proportion to their 
levels of observable business activities. The 
language of the BEPS Action Plan indeed 
indicated possible willingness to depart from the 
arm’s-length principle as historically understood, 
saying that although the OECD would try in its 
BEPS recommendations to remain consistent with 
the arm’s-length principle, “special measures, 
either within or beyond the arm’s length principle, 
may be required. . . .”15 A few months later, the 
OECD Secretariat’s top tax official, Pascal Saint-
Amans, alarmed practitioners further when he 
described himself as “agnostic” with respect to 
the longstanding debate between the arm’s-length 
principle and formulary approaches to the 
division of income among related companies.16
The BEPS final recommendations on transfer 
pricing, however, released late in 2015, do not 
contain “special measures,” and disclaim any 
intention to depart from the arm’s-length 
principle. Instead, the recommendations seek to 
solve the problem of excessive apportionment of 
income to zero- or low-tax affiliates by addressing 
how the transfer pricing rules determine which 
members of a multinational group should be 
treated as bearing the groups’ business risks. In 
particular, the BEPS final report has revised the 
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines to provide 
that, regardless of the language of intragroup 
contracts seeking to assign risks to particular 
members, an affiliate can be treated for tax 
purpose as bearing particular business risks only 
if it in fact “controls” the bearing of those risks.17
The question whether a member of a group 
controls specified risks is based on a subjective, 
facts-and-circumstances test:
Control over risk involves … (i) the 
capability to make decisions to take on, lay 
off, or decline a risk-bearing opportunity, 
together with the actual performance of 
that decision-making function and (ii) the 
capability to make decisions on whether 
and how to respond to the risks associated 
with the opportunity, together with the 
actual performance of that decision-
making function. It is not necessary for a 
party to perform the day-to-day 
mitigation, as described in (iii) in order to 
have control of the risks. Such day-to-day 
mitigation may be outsourced . . . 
However, where these day-to-day 
mitigation activities are outsourced, 
control of the risk would require 
capability to determine the objectives of 
the outsourced activities, to decide to hire 
the provider of the risk mitigation 
functions, to assess whether the objectives 
are being adequately met, and, where 




OECD, “Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (Feb. 12, 
2013), at 8.
14
OECD, “Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (July 19, 
2013), at 20.
15
OECD Action Plan at 20:
Alternative income allocation systems, including formula based 
systems, are sometimes suggested. However, the importance of 
concerted action and the practical difficulties associated with 
agreeing to and implementing the details of a new system 
consistently across all countries mean that, rather than seeking to 
replace the current transfer pricing system, the best course is to 
directly address the flaws in the current system, in particular with 
respect to returns related to intangible assets, risk and over-
capitalisation. Nevertheless, special measures, either within or 
beyond the arm’s length principle, may be required with respect to 
intangible assets, risk and over-capitalisation.
16
PricewaterhouseCoopers, “An Interview with Pascal Saint-Amans” 
(Feb. 2014); see also Stephanie Soong Johnston, “Pascal Saint-Amans — 
The Face of BEPS,” Tax Notes Int’l, Dec. 22, 2014, p. 1051.
17
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2017), at paras. 1.61 ff.
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the contract with that provider, together 
with the performance of such assessment 
and decision-making. In accordance with 
this definition of control, a party requires 
both capability and functional 
performance as described above in order 
to exercise control over a risk.18
This language is then followed in the newly 
revised Transfer Pricing Guidelines by five 
paragraphs detailing the various facts that a tax 
examiner is supposed to consider in determining 
whether personnel of a zero- or low-tax affiliate 
are exercising sufficient hands-on supervisory 
responsibility over a business activity to be seen 
as “controlling” the activity. The paragraphs 
avoid any language that could be seen as 
establishing a bright-line quantitative test for the 
level of supervisory activity that will suffice to 
constitute control.
The new control-of-risk test therefore makes 
inevitable difficult controversies between tax 
planners and tax authorities: how many people, at 
what levels of seniority, must a zero- or low-tax 
subsidiary employ to establish “control” over the 
subsidiary’s claimed business risks? This kind of 
controversy will not be new: for years tax 
practitioners, concerned with the “substance over 
form” doctrine or “general anti-avoidance” rules 
that, as described in Chapter 3, virtually all 
countries have long had in effect, have been 
reluctant to endorse tax plans in which a zero- or 
low-tax company has no employees or observable 
business activities at all. The standard of practice 
instead generally has been to require at least some 
observable quantum of personnel and activities; 
and given the difficulty faced by tax authorities in 
seeking adjustments based on subjective 
“substance” tests, minimal physical activity in 
zero- and low-tax jurisdictions often suffices, as a 
matter of practice, to sustain BEPS-style planning 
structures. Given its lack of a quantitative basis for 
determining whether control of risk has been 
achieved, it is difficult to see how the new test is 
likely to substantially change this result.
Further, even to the extent that the new 
control-of-risk test proves to demand a greater 
quantum of substance than was required of zero- 
or low-tax affiliates under prior law, the new test 
is more likely to be of use for tax enforcement 
purposes by “residence” countries, in which 
multinationals are based, than in “source” 
countries like, generally, lower-income countries. 
The tax administration of a country in which a 
multinational group is based might argue that, for 
example, a low- or zero-tax intangibles holding 
company does not genuinely control the risks 
related to the intangibles it purports to earn, but 
that those risks are in reality borne by the parent 
company. The tax administration might therefore 
insist that royalty income that is paid to the 
holding company should instead be treated as 
paid to the parent company. The same argument 
might be made with respect to a zero- or low-tax 
financing company: the tax administration might 
argue that the parent rather than the financing 
company in reality controls the risks related to 
intragroup loans, so that interest income received 
by the financing company should be taxable 
instead to the parent company.
The new control-of-risk test, however, would 
seem to be of less potential use to the tax 
administrations of source countries, from which, 
for example, royalties are paid to a group’s zero- 
or low-tax intangibles holding company, or 
interest is paid to a group’s zero- or low-tax 
financing affiliate. In response to a transfer 
pricing challenge, the local companies paying 
royalties and interest can raise the defense that the 
amounts they are paying do not exceed arm’s-
length levels; and that the fact that the payments 
are made to arguably insubstantial group 
affiliates, rather than to the group’s parent 
company or another member of the global 
affiliated group, should not affect the 
deductibility of the payments.19 That is, from the 
perspective of the source country, the governing 
18
OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (2017), para. 1.65.
19
Consider, for example, Parentco, located in a high-tax country, 
which establishes an intangibles holding company, Intangico, located in 
a zero-tax country. Intangico is granted ownership of a number of 
Parentco’s intangible assets, which Intangico on-licenses to 
manufacturing affiliates located in developing countries around the 
world, in return for royalties. Assume that the royalties represent arm’s-
length consideration for use of the licensed intangibles, but that 
Intangico performs no activities in “control” of the risks associated with 
the intangibles. Under this scenario, if a group affiliate in a developing 
country pays arm’s-length royalties to Intangico, the tax administration 
in Parentco’s country might have a persuasive argument under the new 
control-of-risk test that the royalties should be taxed to Parentco rather 
than Intangico — but the tax administration in the country from which 
the royalties are paid is unlikely to be able to argue persuasively that the 
royalties should not be deductible in that country.
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question with respect to the deductibility of 
outbound payments is whether they exceed 
arm’s-length compensation for what the paying 
company is receiving in return from foreign 
members of its multinational group in the 
aggregate, not whether the compensation is paid 
to one particular group member instead of 
another.
This does not mean that the control-of-risk test 
might not offer some base-protection advantages 
to lower-income countries. To the extent capital-
exporting countries choose to enforce the new test 
rigorously, they will reduce the attractiveness of 
BEPS-style tax planning to their home-based 
multinationals, thereby perhaps reducing the 
levels of tax deductions taken in lower-income 
countries. It is unclear, however, (i) whether as a 
political matter capital-exporting countries will in 
fact desire to enforce the new control-of-risk test 
rigorously, or (ii) given the subjective nature of the 
new test, whether courts in capital-exporting 
countries will support tax adjustments that might 
be made under it. In sum, therefore, while the new 
control-of-risk test might reduce overall global 
demand for profit shifting from lower-income 
countries, the extent if any to which that effect will 
materialize remains to be seen.
The BEPS Reports and the TNMM
The BEPS reports do not directly address 
problems of the Transactional Net Margin 
Method (TNMM) which, as discussed in Chapter 
3, is the transfer pricing method that lower-
income countries typically apply in attempting to 
ensure that local subsidiaries of multinational 
groups report reasonable levels of taxable income. 
In the aftermath of the BEPS project, however, the 
OECD, along with the IMF, the United Nations, 
and the World Bank, have established a “Platform 
for Collaboration on Tax (PCT)” to provide 
technical assistance in transfer pricing 
administration to developing countries. The PCT 
has produced a detailed study (labeled a 
“Toolkit”) of the administrative challenges posed 
by different OECD transfer pricing methods, 
including the TNMM.20 The Toolkit can fairly be 
seen as the functional equivalent of a BEPS report 
on TNMM as it is applied in developing countries, 
and it offers some important observations.
The Toolkit reports that tax administrations in 
developing countries often have been unable to 
identify sufficient numbers of “uncontrolled 
comparables,” from commercially available 
financial databases or other sources, to apply the 
TNMM effectively.21 In the absence of sufficient 
data on comparables, it can be impossible to argue 
with reasonable persuasiveness (the kind of 
persuasiveness that might support a finding in 
court) that the income of a taxpayer is lower than 
the taxpayer would have earned at arm’s length. 
The Toolkit offers various means by which tax 
administrations might try to expand the pool of 
available comparables, for example by accepting 
comparables from other areas of the world, or 
perhaps by using comparables information 
derived from tax returns in the tax 
administration’s files, as well as from 
commercially available financial databases.
The Toolkit acknowledges, however, that 
these measures will not suffice, in many 
circumstances, to generate a persuasive case that 
a local subsidiary should be earning income of at 
least a specified level:
This reality means that all parties need to 
be realistic about the use of comparability 
data and avoid the misperception that 
comparability analyses always result in a 
well-defined and definitive answer. It is 
often necessary to recognise that a 
20
Platform for Collaboration on Tax, “A Toolkit for Addressing 
Difficulties in Accessing Comparables Data for Transfer Pricing 
Analyses” (2017).
21
The Toolkit says at page 12:
A common concern of developing economies in the 
implementation of transfer pricing regimes relates to difficulties in 
accessing information on “comparables”: data on transactions 
between independent parties used in the application of the arm’s 
length principle. . . .
Available statistics and academic research on the availability of 
information on comparables corroborate the difficulties reported by 
many developing countries. Often, the information relevant to a 
jurisdiction can only be accessed through the purchase of a licence 
from database providers. However, even putting aside the financial 
cost of acquiring access to such databases, challenges for 
developing country tax administrations often remain, particularly 
in cases where little relevant information relating to a specific 
jurisdiction or even region exists. Where the information does exist, 
it may exhibit differences compared to the transactions under 
review. Typically, in such cases, transfer pricing practitioners need 
to consider using imperfect data, including the use of data from 
foreign markets. However, the effectiveness of such approaches has 
not been studied sufficiently to enable definitive conclusions to be 
drawn about when they are reliable or how any adjustments to 
account for such differences should be applied.
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comparability analysis provides only an 
approximate answer and that some 
flexibility is needed to determine a 
principled answer in many cases.22
The Toolkit suggests that even if available 
comparables are insufficient to permit a definitive 
answer in a transfer pricing examination, the 
available data might provide a tax authority with 
a basis for negotiation of a resolution with the 
taxpayer.23 A transfer pricing method that 
provides only a starting point for negotiation with 
taxpayers, however, is not appropriate for 
principled and transparent tax administration. 
The TNMM, therefore, remains an unsolved 
problem for tax administrations: although 
TNMM is the only OECD-endorsed transfer 
pricing method that is, as a practical matter, 
available to lower-income country tax 
administrations in many cases to try to control 
base erosion and profit shifting, the method 
remains too flawed to serve this purpose 
effectively.24
The Toolkit mentions several possible routes 
toward improving the performance of TNMM. 
First, the Toolkit describes (but does not endorse) 
the approach to transfer pricing that is used by 
Brazil.25 Brazil employs a transfer pricing method 
that is similar to TNMM, but which does not rely 
on searches for comparables; instead, the tax 
authority publishes required minimum margins 
for companies performing different kinds of 
activities in the country.26 The Brazilian fixed-
margin approach, however, is inconsistent with 
the political settlement within the OECD that 
gave rise to the TNMM in 1995 — particularly the 
insistence on case-by-case, factually intensive 
examinations of each taxpayer, with 
individualized searches for comparables.27 Even 
today, in light of growing recognition of the 
difficulties of applying TNMM, it is unlikely that 
many OECD members would consider favorably 
an approach like Brazil’s, which dispenses with 
case-by-case identification of comparables.28 
Therefore, at least in the short term, it seems 
unlikely that widespread adoption of a Brazilian-
style fixed margin approach will solve the 
difficulties faced by low-income country tax 
administrations in attempting to apply TNMM.
The Toolkit also considers an approach to 
simplifying administration of TNMM that is in 
some ways similar to but not as prescriptive as the 
Brazilian fixed-margin approach, namely the 
statement by a tax administration of “safe harbor” 
net margins for specified categories of local 
subsidiaries of multinational groups.29 For 
example, minimum safe-harbor profit margins 
might be prescribed for subsidiaries engaged in 
distribution, in manufacturing, and in the 
provision of various kinds of services. Taxpayers 
would be assured that if their operating margins 
were at least as high as the safe-harbor levels, the 
tax authority would not subject them to further 
transfer pricing examination. The safe-harbor 
margin levels would not be binding on taxpayers 
— that is, if a taxpayer believes that the applicable 
safe harbor margin is too high, the taxpayer 





Some countries, particularly those that are more experienced in 
transfer pricing seek to mitigate this issue by negotiating with 
taxpayers to arrive at a sensible, arm’s length result, however 
others, particularly many developing countries, prefer to avoid 
settlement of cases in this manner. Further, many developing 
countries report that they do not have the capacity to negotiate in 
this way. However, where tax administrations do negotiate with 
taxpayers, the available data will inform the negotiations.
24
The Toolkit observes that TNMM is not the only transfer pricing 
method potentially available to tax authorities, and that in some cases, 
especially where the activities of a local subsidiary seem to generate 
locally valuable intangibles, a profit-split method might be most 
appropriate. See, e.g., PCT Toolkit, note 20 above, at 28-29. The profit 
split method, however, requires tax administrators to analyze not only a 
multinational group’s local operations, but also the operations of other 
group affiliates located around the world. In practice, convincing profit 
split analyses can surpass the technical capacity of even the best-
resourced revenue administrations, and transfer pricing enforcement in 
lower-income countries generally is likely to remain limited, as a 




The Brazilian transfer pricing rules are described in detail in 
Chapter D.1 of the U.N. Practical Transfer Pricing Manual for 
Developing Countries, note 5 above. In the PCT Toolkit, note 20 above, 
the Brazilian approach is described at pages 75-76. (As a technical point, 
it should be noted that the “margins” specified under the Brazilian 
approach are gross margins, rather than the net margins prescribed for 
use under TNMM. It should be possible, however, also to apply the 
Brazilian approach in the context of a transfer pricing method based on 
net instead of gross margins.)
27
See the discussion of the origins of the TNMM in Chapter 3.
28
In connection with Brazil’s proposed membership in the OECD, the 
Brazilian government and the OECD are, at this writing, exploring 
means of harmonizing the current Brazilian approach to transfer pricing 
with the OECD Guidelines. See Stephanie Soong Johnston and Ryan M. 
Finley, “OECD and Brazil to Explore Convergence on Transfer Pricing,” 
Tax Notes Int’l, Mar. 5, 2018, p. 959.
29
PCT Toolkit, note 20 above, at 75, 82-84.
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tax return. The overall success of the safe harbor 
depends, however, on the hope that many 
taxpayers would choose to comply with the safe 
harbor to avoid the costs and uncertainties of 
undergoing intensive transfer pricing 
examination.30
The 1995 OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines, 
reflecting their overall aversion to any departure 
from the use of comparables in transfer pricing 
enforcement, expressed disapproval of transfer 
pricing safe harbors.31 In 2013, however, the 
OECD revised the Guidelines and endorsed the 
use by countries of safe harbors as an aid to 
transfer pricing administration.32 Therefore, at 
least in theory, transfer pricing safe harbors fall 
within the OECD’s “international consensus” of 
acceptable tax administration mechanisms.
Nevertheless, in practice, countries have made 
relatively little use of transfer pricing safe harbors 
as a means of simplifying the application of 
TNMM. India appears to be the only country to 
have attempted the use of transfer pricing safe 
harbors on a large scale.33 Practitioners, however, 
appear to have perceived the Indian safe harbor 
margins as unrealistically high, and few taxpayers 
reportedly have followed them. The difficulties 
seen in the Indian safe-harbor regime reflect a 
problem inherent in safe harbors under TNMM. If 
the tax authority sets the required safe harbor 
margins too low, they will be seen as permitting 
taxpayers to report income below the proper 
arm’s-length level; but if the tax authority sets the 
safe harbor margins too high, taxpayers will 
report income below the safe-harbor levels and 
risk examination.
Another problem in designing safe harbors is 
determining the extent, if any, to which taxpayers 
who report incomes below safe-harbor levels 
should be subjected to heightened scrutiny by tax 
authorities. The most common-sense approach 
arguably would be to subject these taxpayers to 
both an enhanced likelihood of selection for audit 
and a strong burden of persuasion in supporting 
margins below safe-harbor levels. A safe harbor 
with this kind of relatively strong presumptive 
effect, however, arguably would be difficult to 
distinguish in practice from the politically 
problematic Brazilian approach. Moreover, even 
if a country attempts to subject taxpayers with 
margins below safe-harbor levels to strong 
adverse presumptions in tax audits, the only 
transfer pricing method by which the tax 
administration can attempt to enforce the 
presumption is likely as a practical matter to be 
the TNMM, which remains largely ineffective in 
application because of the absence of 
comparables.
In sum, transfer pricing safe harbors at least in 
theory offer potential administrative advantages 
for lower-income countries, by inducing some 
taxpayers to avail themselves of the safe harbor 
margins and thereby reduce pressure on the 
transfer pricing audit process. Some key problems 
in the design of safe harbors, however, remain 
unresolved. Perhaps the most important of these 
unsolved problems are (i) the levels at which safe 
harbor margins should be set and (ii) the degree of 
presumptiveness that should be afforded to the 
published safe-harbor margins. Progress in 
resolving these problems is likely to occur only 
incrementally, as additional countries seek to 
implement safe harbors.
As an additional approach to improving 
transfer pricing enforcement in developing 
countries, the PCT Toolkit envisions technical 
assistance to help tax administrators broaden the 
criteria for identifying acceptable comparables 
under TNMM.34 For example, the Toolkit 
30
The discussion in the following paragraphs is based in large part on 
the analysis of transfer pricing safe harbors in Michael C. Durst, 
“Assisting Developing Countries in Taxation After the OECD’s BEPS 
Reports: A Suggested Approach for the Donor Community,” ICTD 
Working Paper No. 71 (2017).
31
See OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (1995), chapter 4(E) (text 
subsequently replaced as described below).
32
OECD, “Revised Section E on Safe Harbours in Chapter IV of the 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines” (May 2013).
33
See generally Patricia G. Lewis, “Where Have All the Safe Harbors 
Gone? A Plea for Reinvigoration,” Bloomberg BNA Transfer Pricing Report 
(Feb. 23, 2017). See also Richard S. Collier and Joseph L. Andrus, Transfer 
Pricing and the Arm’s Length Principle After BEPS (2017), at 269-270 
(noting the historical lack of use of transfer pricing safe harbors and 
encouraging countries to give safe harbors closer consideration).
34
The PCT Toolkit, note 20 above, summarizes these elements of the 
PCT’s technical assistance plans at page 84:
Undertake further research and spread available good practices on 
measures that may be taken to use existing data more effectively. Such 
guidance might include the challenges, and options for using data 
from foreign markets, the use of data drawn from widened search 
criteria, and the use of comparability adjustments. There is limited 
evidence on the impact of geographic differences on profitability. 
This is an area which could benefit from further research, and the 
suggested mechanism for increasing the pool of data, described at 
point 1 above, may provide data to support such research.
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envisions providing assistance in adjusting the 
results of comparables found in databases 
covering different geographic regions, and in 
supplementing data from commercial databases 
with data culled from taxpayers’ returns (with 
safeguards to prevent disclosure of information 
that might be associated with particular 
taxpayers). If successful, these kinds of assistance 
could help tax administrators to assemble larger 
numbers of comparables for use in a transfer 
pricing examination, and thereby to make a more 
persuasive case for adjustment when taxpayers 
have reported apparently low levels of income.
The Toolkit envisions continuation of current 
efforts under the auspices of the OECD and other 
international organizations, to provide training to 
transfer pricing examiners in developing 
countries. The still-unsolved nature of the 
problem of comparables under TNMM raises the 
question whether this training is likely to be cost 
effective. Even the best-trained of tax examiners 
are unlikely to be able, in the course of a tax audit, 
to generate sufficiently large numbers of 
comparables to support a scientifically defensible 
TNMM analysis. Therefore, there is a danger that 
technical assistance could serve mainly to provide 
a veneer of progress that might tend to obscure 
the continuing dysfunction of the current transfer 
pricing rules.
Against this, however, as the Toolkit points 
out, in practice transfer pricing examinations 
sometimes are resolved based not upon 
scientifically conclusive analyses of comparables, 
but instead upon de facto negotiation between 
taxpayers and examiners.35 In this connection, 
enhanced training of examiners in TNMM could 
be helpful for two reasons: (i) the training could 
increase examiners’ skills in pointing out 
vulnerabilities to taxpayers with respect to their 
reported return positions, thereby enhancing the 
kinds of resolutions that auditors are able to 
negotiate; and (ii) the training could increase the 
pool of available transfer pricing auditors, thereby 
increasing the number of instances in which 
revenue recoveries are obtained through 
negotiation. Revenue recoveries through 
increased transfer pricing audit coverage are 
especially likely if audit coverage in a jurisdiction 
has historically been limited. Therefore, despite 
the defects of current transfer pricing methods, 
incremental revenue recoveries from training 
efforts, especially in the initial years following the 
training, could be substantial.
Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB), a 
collaboration of the OECD and the United 
Nations, has been providing on-the-job training to 
transfer pricing examiners for several years, and 
revenue recoveries reportedly have been 
significant.36 It seems sensible to continue and 
even expand these efforts, so long as the revenue 
benefits appear significantly to outweigh the 
costs.
It is important, however, that training and 
other forms of technical assistance not be 
permitted to mask the need for transfer pricing 
methods that can be applied more persuasively 
than is possible today. In particular, the 
persistence of a regime in which results can only 
be negotiated, rather than determined with 
reasonable certainty, is unacceptable in the long or 
even medium terms, given the obvious dangers 
presented with respect to the integrity as well as 
the effectiveness of revenue administration.
Transfer Pricing Documentation under BEPS
BEPS Action 13 addressed the topic of 
“Transfer Pricing Documentation and Country-
by-Country Reporting.”37 The requirement that 
taxpayers maintain transfer pricing 
“documentation” originated in the United States 
during the early 1990s, and it has now spread to 
dozens of countries around the world at all levels 
of economic development.38 The idea has been 
that by maintaining, and making available to tax 
authorities on request, a comprehensive 
explanation of the policies under which they 




See the reports of recent TIWB activities at tiwb.org.
37
The OECD’s recommendations under Article 13 are contained in 
two documents, “Guidance on Transfer Pricing Documentation and 
Country-by-Country Reporting” (Sept. 2014) and a brief “Final Report 
on Action 13” (Oct. 2015).
38
For historical background, see Michael C. Durst and Robert E. 
Culbertson, “Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective Methods and 
Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing Today,” 57 Tax Law 
Review 37, 96-98 (2003).
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tax inspectors to perform more effective transfer 
pricing audits.
In practice, it has been my impression that in 
many instances, transfer pricing documentation 
proves to be of surprisingly limited value to tax 
examiners. During the 1990s, as first the United 
States and then dozens of other countries began 
requiring documentation, its drafting quickly 
became a routinized function of accounting firms 
and other consultants around the world. In part 
through the movement of personnel among 
accounting and other firms, transfer pricing 
documentation quickly took on a standardized 
format. In the documentation, much of the factual 
description of the taxpayer’s business has tended 
to be copied from annual reports or similar 
documents prepared under securities laws; this 
material is publicly available and would be 
readily available to tax inspectors even in the 
absence of the documentation. The 
documentation also contains the results of 
taxpayers’ computerized comparable searches; 
however, in most instances the analyses are 
performed under TNMM, and because of the 
difficulties of statistical analysis under that 
method, the “arm’s-length ranges” reported in the 
documentation generally are, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, too wide to be very useful in tax 
enforcement.
After a few years of operating with transfer 
pricing documentation in the United States, it 
became clear that in practice, many examiners 
were not reviewing the documentation.39 
Examiners in the United States are now required 
to memorialize in their files that they have read 
the taxpayer’s transfer pricing documentation, 
but it is not clear whether this requirement has led 
to enhanced revenue recoveries.
Under BEPS Action 13, the OECD has 
prescribed a standard format to be used 
internationally for transfer pricing 
documentation. Information on the multinational 
group’s global activities (the “master file”) is to be 
combined with information on local activities in 
each country (the “local file”). The OECD 
recommendations also contain standard 
templates for the presentation of information, 
designed to make the documentation more useful 
to tax examiners. Tax administrations around the 
world are adopting the OECD’s 
recommendations, and they are likely to be used 
widely by tax administrations.
The Action 13 report also recommends that 
countries require large multinational groups 
(those with consolidated global sales greater than 
€750 million) to prepare, and make available to 
the tax authorities, a “country-by-country (CbC) 
report” that compares the distribution of the 
group’s taxable income, among the countries 
where it operates, to the distribution of the 
group’s active business activities among those 
countries, as measured by the group’s sales, the 
value of its tangible assets, and its number of 
employees in each country. The country-by-
country report therefore shows tax authorities 
how the apportionment of a group’s income 
among countries differs from the apportionment 
that might have resulted from a three-factor 
formulary system. Governments generally have 
reacted favorably to the OECD’s recommendation 
with respect to country-by-country reports, and 
many member as well as non-member countries 
are implementing the new requirement.40
The OECD promotes country-by-country 
reporting as a potentially valuable risk 
assessment tool for tax administrations in 
conducting transfer pricing examinations: 
presumably, the country-by-country breakdown 
will assist examiners in identifying situations 
where income is being shifted from their 
jurisdictions to zero- or low-tax affiliates. The 
country-by-country proposal, however, 
originated not with the OECD or national tax 
administrations but instead with NGOs, which 
had in mind for it a broader function.41 The NGOs 
advocated that multinational groups’ country-by-
country reports be made available not only to tax 
authorities, but also to the public. The apparent 
hope was that public dissemination of the CbC 
39
See Memorandum from IRS chief corporate enforcement official 
Larry Langdon to IRS Executives, Managers, and Agents (Jan. 22, 2003) 
(reminding of the need for examiners to request transfer pricing 
documentation).
40
See OECD, “BEPS Action 13: OECD Releases CbC Reporting 
Implementation Status and Exchange Relationships Between Tax 
Administrations” (Oct. 11, 2017).
41
See generally Richard Murphy of Tax Justice Network, “Country-
by-Country Reporting” (2012).
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reports would generate continuing political 
pressures for change to international tax rules, 
particularly in the direction of formulary 
apportionment. The proposal for public 
disclosure, however, departed from a 
longstanding global tradition of treating 
companies’ tax filings as confidential, and the 
OECD did not adopt it. To the contrary, the 
OECD’s report on Action 13 recommends strongly 
that tax authorities protect country-by-country 
reports from public disclosure. In addition, the 
OECD emphasizes that although it expects the 
country-by-country reports to be useful to tax 
authorities for risk assessment, the requirement 
does not reflect an intention to establish 
formulary apportionment as a substantive rule — 
and in particular, countries are not to use the 
country-by-country reports as the basis for tax 
adjustments made on formulary principles.
It is important, I believe, to be cautious in 
expectations that the new documentation rules, 
including the CbC rules, will fundamentally 
enhance the capacities of tax examiners in 
practice. In my experience, a barrier to effective 
transfer pricing examinations often is not that tax 
inspectors lack necessary information, but instead 
that they are expected in theory, under the OECD 
Transfer Pricing Guidelines and similar bodies of 
national regulation, to consult a broader range of 
information about a taxpayer than can be 
organized and digested in a real-life tax audit.42 
Presenting the same or a higher volume of 
information, but in an internationally 
standardized format, may have only limited 
effects on the quality of transfer pricing 
examinations that can be performed under 
applicable rules.
Given the attention that has been paid them, it 
is especially important to be realistic about the 
practical effects on tax audits of the new CbC 
reports. Even without the reports, it should be 
apparent to tax examiners in a country whether 
taxpayers are making large deductible payments 
to affiliates; the additional flood of information 
presented in the CbC reports may complicate as 
much as enhance enforcement efforts.43 Further, 
even if the new reports do provide tax 
administrators with additional knowledge 
concerning disparities between where income is 
earned and where economic activity takes place, 
the tax administrators may have no legal means, 
under the still-applicable arm’s-length transfer 
pricing rules, of translating the knowledge into 
additional revenue recoveries. The significance of 
the new CbC requirement, in sum, may be more 
symbolic and less substantive than has been 
hoped.
The BEPS Project and CFC Rules
The OECD’s Action 3 Report
Action 3 of the OECD’s BEPS effort addressed 
the task of “Designing Effective Controlled 
Foreign Company Rules.” CFC rules, it will be 
recalled from Chapter 3, are laws, following a 
pattern originated by the United States in 1962, by 
which many countries have sought to limit the 
benefits to their home-based multinationals from 
shifting income from countries where they 
operate to affiliates in zero- or low-tax countries. 
Essentially, under a CFC rule, any amounts 
accumulated in zero- or low-tax affiliates are 
treated as “CFC income” and become taxable by 
the home country.
If all countries subjected their home-based 
multinationals to strict CFC rules, the incidence of 
BEPS around the world would be substantially 
reduced if not eliminated. Thus, lower-income 
and other countries would enjoy substantial 
protections of their corporate tax bases. As 
42
A sample “functional analysis” questionnaire, to be used by 
examiners in transfer pricing examinations, is attached to the PCT 
Toolkit, note 20 above, as Appendix 1. It should be apparent from a 
reading of this document that detailed “functional analysis” conforming 
with OECD standards occurs more frequently in theory than in practice.
43
The Canada Revenue Agency has prepared for the OECD a risk-
assessment manual for use with CbC reports. Although the manual 
suggests numerous ways in which tax examiners might employ CbC 
reports to identify taxpayers for transfer pricing examination, the 
manual also contains the following warning:
One of the most basic challenges faced by tax authorities will be the 
sheer volume of information provided. CbC Reports are prepared 
by the largest MNE groups, many of which include hundreds or 
even thousands of entities, across a large number of jurisdictions. In 
addition, jurisdictions will vary in terms of the number of CbC 
Reports they will receive, but some large jurisdictions are expecting 
to receive several thousand reports (including those received from 
foreign tax authorities). This quantity of information will pose a 
particular problem for tax authorities that rely on manual 
processes, but even those which currently use automated systems 
may find it challenging to determine information relevant to their 
jurisdiction, to apply risk assessment tools and to identify risk flags 
among such a large volume of data.
OECD, BEPS Action 13 Country-by-Country Reporting: Handbook 
on Effective Tax Risk Assessment (2017), at 46.
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described in Chapter 3, however, capital-
exporting countries have allowed their CFC rules 
to become relatively toothless over time. The 
problem has basically been political: when a 
country imposes CFC rules, it precludes its own 
multinationals from benefiting from profit-
shifting opportunities that might remain available 
to other countries’ multinationals.
The OECD’s Action 3 report acknowledges the 
political difficulties that have led to the 
maintenance of weak CFC rules, referring 
somewhat delicately to the need to “strik[e] a 
balance between taxing foreign income and 
maintaining competitiveness.”44 The report also 
notes the possibility that capital-exporting 
countries might, at least in theory, mitigate 
concerns regarding competitiveness through 
multilateral coordination of their CFC rules.45 The 
report, however, perhaps bowing to political 
reality, makes no move toward advocacy of a 
global network of strict CFC rules as a primary 
goal of the BEPS project.
Instead, the bulk of the Action 3 report 
consists of an exhaustive and, in tone, academic 
discussion of the various technical choices that 
legislatures and tax authorities must make in 
drafting CFC statutes and regulations.46 
Apparently, lack of consensus among 
governments during the BEPS process prevented 
the OECD from taking a more prescriptive 
approach to the topic of CFC rules, 
notwithstanding the rules’ potential for 
eliminating BEPS around the world through 
collective action by capital-exporting countries.
The Action 3 report notes that some countries’ 
CFC rules attempt to tax only income that is 
shifted from the multinational’s home country 
(that is, from the country that has enacted the CFC 
rules), rather than from other countries.47 The 
approach of protecting only the tax base of the 
home country removes the protection that CFC 
rules might otherwise afford to the tax bases of 
other countries, including lower-income 
countries.48 Rules incorporating this approach 
arguably should not be considered CFC rules at 
all, but rather should be seen as a different species 
of self-protective base protection measure that 
countries might implement.49
CFC Rules and the EU Anti-Tax Avoidance 
Directive
In July 2016, as a follow-up to the OECD’s final 
BEPS reports, the Council of the European Union 
issued an “Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive” 
prescribing minimum standards for anti-tax 
avoidance legislation which EU member states 
were to enact by the end of 2018.50 It is not clear 
whether the Directive will permit member states 
to adopt CFC rules that apply only to income 
shifted from the enacting country itself, or 
whether countries will be required to maintain 
CFC rules that also protect the tax bases of other 
countries.
Even if the Directive is interpreted to require 
members to adopt rules that protect the tax bases 
of other countries, however, the effect on the 
global extent of base erosion and profit shifting 
may not prove very large. The Directive permits 
member countries to exempt from coverage by 
44
OECD BEPS Action 3 Report at 15.
45
Id. at 16:
[A] way to maintain competitiveness would be to ensure that more 
countries implement similar CFC rules. This is therefore a space 
where countries working collectively and adopting similar rules 
could reduce the competitiveness concerns that individual 
countries may have when considering whether to implement CFC 
rules.
46
One practitioner’s critique of an intermediate draft of the Action 3 
report was entitled, “How Not to Engage with CFC Rules.” Kimberly 
Blanchard, Bloomberg BNA International Tax Monitor (Sept. 15, 2015).
47
This topic is discussed in the OECD Action 3 report at 15-16. An 
example is provided by the CFC rules currently maintained by the 
United Kingdom; see the U.K. government explanation of the rules at 
U.K. Government, “Controlled Foreign Companies: An Overview” (Apr. 
13, 2013).
48
The OECD’s Action 3 report criticizes this characteristic of CFC 
rules that protect the tax base only of the parent country:
CFC rules that focus only on parent jurisdiction stripping may not 
be as effective against BEPS arrangements for two reasons. First, it 
may not be possible to determine which country’s base has been 
stripped (for example, in the case of stateless income). Second, even 
if it were possible to determine which country’s base was stripped, 
the BEPS Action Plan aims to prevent erosion of all tax bases, 
including those of third countries. This issue may be of particular 
relevance for developing countries because there may be more of an 
incentive to structure through low-tax jurisdictions in the absence 
of CFC rules that focus on foreign-to-foreign stripping.
Action 3 report at 16 (footnote omitted).
49
Cf. the related discussion of the U.K. and Australian Diverted 
Profits Tax rules, and the U.S. Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT), 
below at notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
50
Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 of 12 July 2016 laying down rules 
against tax avoidance practices that directly affect the functioning of the 
internal market.
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CFC rules income transferred to a zero- or low-tax 
company that “carries on a substantive economic 
activity supported by staff, equipment, assets and 
premises, as evidenced by relevant facts and 
circumstances.” This is a vague test, similar in 
form to the “minimum substance” tests contained 
in many general anti-avoidance rules (GAARs) 
around the world. Depending on how member 
countries choose to interpret the test, CFC practice 
in the European Union might quickly devolve 
into gamesmanship, with companies seeking to 
satisfy the test through the assignment to zero- or 
low-tax affiliates of only token numbers of 
employees, and minimal levels of physical 
business activity. If EU governments accept this 
interpretation, the effect of European CFC rules 
on demand for BEPS planning could be quite 
limited.
In fairness, it should not be assumed that EU 
countries will interpret the requirement for CFC 
rules in so permissive a manner. EU governments 
may instead require that subsidiaries in zero- or 
low-tax jurisdictions demonstrate a high 
quantum of observable, profit-motivated business 
activities to be exempted from CFC rules. An 
interpretation of this kind might make it difficult 
for EU-based multinationals to continue to 
engage in BEPS-style tax planning, thus affording 
significant protections to lower-income countries 
around the world. Moreover, the maintenance by 
EU countries of effective CFC rules could 
establish a normative standard for capital-
exporting countries outside the European Union, 
resulting in further reductions in profit-shifting 
globally.
The ‘GILTI’ Tax: Revival of CFC Concept in 2017 
U.S. Tax Reform
In its tax reform legislation of December 2017, 
the United States enacted a special tax on the 
“Global Intangible Low-Taxed Income (GILTI)” of 
U.S.-owned multinational groups. The GILTI tax 
is complex in its structure:51 somewhat simplified, 
it generally imposes a U.S. tax, at a rate of 10.5 
percent (half the regular U.S. corporate rate of 21 
percent), on that portion of a U.S.-owned group’s 
foreign income that exceeds a 10-percent return 
on the value of the group’s foreign tangible assets, 
except to the extent that the income has already 
been subject to foreign tax. Thus, roughly 
speaking (as the actual computations are complex 
and depend upon the availability to the U.S. 
taxpayer of foreign tax credits), the GILTI tax 
subjects the non-U.S. income of U.S.-based 
multinational groups, above a “routine” level 
(defined as a return of 10 percent on the group’s 
foreign tangible assets), to a minimum tax of 10.5 
percent.
The GILTI tax would appear to remove some 
of the financial benefit to U.S.-owned 
multinationals from engaging in BEPS planning 
around the world, and therefore may reduce some 
of the competitive pressure on lower-income 
countries to tolerate the erosion of their tax bases. 
In practice, however, because of the way that the 
GILTI minimum tax is structured. the degree of 
protection afforded lower-income countries may 
be limited.
During the Obama Administration, the 
president had proposed a minimum tax roughly 
similar in structure to the GILTI tax, except that 
application of the minimum tax would be 
determined on a “per country” basis.52 That is, the 
minimum tax would have applied to the extent 
the U.S.-owned group’s effective tax rate in any 
single country fell below the stated threshold 
amount, even if the group was subject to higher 
effective tax rates in other countries. Under the 
“overall” approach of the GILTI tax, however, a 
U.S.-owned group becomes subject to the 
minimum tax only if the average effective non-
U.S. tax rate on all the group’s non-U.S. income 
falls below a threshold level, generally of 13.125 
percent. Thus, under the GILTI tax, a taxpayer 
facing a high tax rate in some countries can 
continue to benefit from shifting profits from 
other countries, even down to an effective tax rate 
of zero in that country, so long as the taxpayer’s 
average foreign tax rate doesn’t fall below the 
threshold. An overall minimum tax like the GILTI 
51
The GILTI tax is contained in Section 951A of the U.S. Internal 
Revenue Code. It is described in detail at pages 622-627 of H.R. Conf. 
Report No. 466, Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, 115th Cong., 1st Sess. (2017).
52
For discussion of the Obama Administration proposal, see Mindy 
Herzfeld, “News Analysis: The Cases for and Against a Minimum Tax,” 
Tax Notes Int’l, Mar. 7, 2016, p. 807. For formal statement of the proposal, 
see U.S. Treasury Department, “General Explanations of the 
Administration’s Fiscal Year 2017 Revenue Proposals” (Feb. 2016), at 9-
12.
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tax therefore discourages BEPS-style tax planning 
less strongly than does a similar tax imposed on a 
per-country basis.53
Given the large role played by the United 
States in the global economy, it is possible that 
even given its overall rather than per-country 
structure, the GILTI tax will reduce overall 
demand for BEPS-style profit-shifting to an extent 
that will meaningfully lessen the pressures of tax 
competition on lower-income countries. If that is 
the case, the GILTI tax might serve as a promising 
model for CFC-like reforms in other countries. If, 
however, the effects of the GILTI tax on demand 
for BEPS-style planning prove very limited, then 
the per-country approach of the Obama 
Administration might be necessary for a GILTI-
style minimum-tax structure to afford adequate 
protection to the tax bases of lower-income 
countries. Careful monitoring of the performance 
of the GILTI tax over time, particularly the extent 
to which the tax planning behavior of U.S. 
multinational groups in lower-income countries 
appears to be affected, may provide valuable 
information for policy-making in the future.
BEPS and Limitations on Interest Deductions
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, the payment 
of interest on intragroup loans extended from 
zero- and low-tax financing companies has for 
many years comprised a large component of 
BEPS-style tax planning around the world. The 
BEPS Action 4 report54 focuses on this topic and 
offers policy recommendations that seem well-
suited to the situation of lower-income countries.
The Action 4 report proceeds from the 
principle that a member of a multinational group 
should be permitted to deduct, for local corporate 
income tax purposes, only its fair share of the 
group’s total indebtedness to unrelated lenders. 
Under this principle, the Action 4 report argues 
that if a multinational group as a whole holds 
indebtedness to unrelated lenders totaling, say, 
€100 million, each member of the group should be 
entitled to deduct interest on a part of that 
amount, in proportion, say, to the member’s share 
of the group’s total income. Thus, as a conceptual 
ideal, the Action 4 report advocates a formulary 
approach to the apportionment of interest 
expense, which the report refers to as a “group 
ratio rule.” A group ratio rule would substantially 
curtail income-shifting through related-party 
loans, because group finance companies could not 
“manufacture” debt to affiliates in excess of the 
group’s actual total indebtedness to outside 
parties.55
Despite the theoretical appeal of the group 
ratio approach, however, the Action 4 report 
concludes that the approach could pose 
administrative problems and might be considered 
overly restrictive by some countries. As an 
alternative, the OECD has recommended that 
countries adopt “fixed ratio” limitations on 
interest deductions, which generally would limit 
each group member’s net interest deductions (that 
is, the excess of interest deductions over interest 
income) to a fixed percentage set at a point in the 
range of 10 to 30 percent of their earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization 53As a simplified example, consider a GILTI-style minimum tax that 
subjects to home country taxation all foreign income that a group earns 
which is not subject to a local tax of at least 12 percent. Assume that a 
multinational conducts operations in two foreign countries, Countries A 
and B, earning $100 million in each country. Assume that Country A 
imposes corporate tax at a rate of 30 percent, and Country B imposes 
corporate tax at a rate of 5 percent. Under an “overall” GILTI-style 
minimum tax, the taxpayer is considered to pay tax at an average rate of 
17.5 percent on all its foreign income, which is above the 12-percent 
threshold, so no minimum tax is imposed. Under a per-country 
approach, however, whereas the taxpayer owes no minimum tax based 
on its operations in Country A, its effective rate in Country B is below 
the 12-percent threshold so that minimum tax is imposed on income 
earned in that country.
54
In October 2015, the OECD released its final report on Action 4: 
Limiting Base Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other 
Financial Payments,” along with its final reports on other BEPS actions. 
Later, in 2017, the OECD released a follow-up study of two technical 
topics: (i) the details of the design of a “group ratio rule, as will be 
explained in the text below; and (ii) the application of interest deduction 
limitations to banks and insurance companies. OECD, “Limiting Base 
Erosion Involving Interest Deductions and Other Financial Payments: 
Action 4 — 2016 Update” (2017).
55
Consider for example a multinational group comprised of a parent 
company in Country A, which owns operating subsidiaries in Countries 
B and C, and a group finance company in zero- or low-tax Country F. 
Assume the group as a whole is subject to indebtedness from unrelated 
parties (for example, bondholders and banks) of $100 million, and that 
the group as a whole pays $8 million annually in interest on this debt. 
The group finance company extends indebtedness to each of the group 
affiliates in Countries A, B, and C of $250 million each, with stated 
interest of $20 million per year. During the taxable year, the parent in 
Country A earns $300 million, and the affiliates in Countries B and C 
each earn $150 million, in EBITDA prior to payment of taxes and 
interest. Under a group ratio approach, since the parent in Country A 
earns 50 percent of the group’s income before interest and taxes, the 
parent would be permitted to deduct half the group’s interest expense 
paid to unrelated lenders, or $4 million; and the affiliates in Countries B 
and C, which each account for 25 percent of the group’s income before 
interest and taxes, would be permitted to deduct $2 million each. No 
deduction would be allowed to any group member for the interest paid 
to the Country H finance company.
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(EBITDA). The report also recommends that 
countries consider allowing companies to use a 
group ratio approach as an elective alternative.
The Action 4 report envisions that countries 
will use the recommended EBITDA-based 
limitations to replace or supplement existing 
“thin-capitalization” rules which, as described in 
Chapter 3, countries historically have used to 
attempt to limit revenue losses from companies’ 
excessive deductions of interest payments. As 
discussed in Chapter 3, thin capitalization rules 
deny interest deductions if a taxpayer’s ratio of 
debt to equity exceeds a specified level (for 
example, 3 to 1). The OECD points out in its 
Action 4 report that multinationals can relatively 
easily avoid application of thin-capitalization 
rules by injecting additional equity into its 
subsidiaries.56
The OECD based its EBITDA 
recommendation on the actions of a number of 
countries around the world that already had 
adopted 30-percent of EBITDA limitations, 
including Germany and Italy, as well as Spain, 
and Finland and Norway, which have 25-percent 
limitations.57 Since the BEPS reports, the United 
Kingdom has implemented a 30-percent of 
EBITDA rule effective April 1, 2017,58 and the 
United States has done so effective January 1, 
2018.59 Under France’s interest deduction 
limitations, which set forth several alternative 
limitations on deductions, interest deductions can 
in some circumstances be limited to 
approximately 25 percent of a taxpayer’s 
EBITDA.60 In addition, the European Union now 
prescribes EBITDA-based limitations as best 
practice for tax administrations among member 
countries, essentially requiring member countries 
to amend their limitations as necessary to 
conform to the new OECD standard.61 In 2013, 
South Africa enacted limitations, which became 
effective in 2015, based generally on 40 percent of 
EBITDA, although the limitation can be higher or 
lower based on fluctuations of market interest 
rates.62 In addition, as of early 2018, the OECD has 
reported that Argentina, India, South Korea, and 
Vietnam have enacted 30-percent-of-EBITDA-
rules, and Norway, Japan, Malaysia, and Turkey 
are taking legislative steps to align their rules with 
the OECD Action 4 recommendations.63
The OECD’s report on BEPS Action 4 cites 
data indicating that the interest expenses of most 
multinational groups on unrelated-party debt are 
substantially below 30 percent of the group’s 
EBITDA, suggesting that a 30-percent limitation 
will continue to allow substantial scope for loan-
centered, BEPS-style tax planning.64 Nevertheless, 
it seems likely based on the OECD data that a 30-
percent limitation has the potential to reduce 
loan-based, BEPS-style tax avoidance to 
substantially below current levels in many 
countries.65 Moreover, although some elements of 
EBITDA-based deduction limitations, like any 
significant corporate tax rules, raise 
administrative complexity,66 the rules are 
relatively simple compared to other kinds of 
corporate tax anti-avoidance measures, and 
should be administrable even by revenue 
agencies of constrained resources. In sum, 
EBITDA-style limitations on interest deductions 
would appear suitable for use by many lower-
income countries.
56
Action 4 report at 21: “[A]n equity test allows entities with higher 
levels of equity capital to deduct more interest expense, which makes it 
relatively easy for a group to manipulate the outcome of a test by 
increasing the level of equity in a particular entity.”
57
See Lee A. Sheppard, “News Analysis: Countries Implement BEPS 
on Their Own,” Tax Notes Int’l, May 26, 2014, p. 692.
58
PricewaterhouseCoopers, “UK Introduces New Corporation Tax 
Limitation on Interest Deductibility” (Mar. 2, 2017).
Although the OECD’s Action 4 report recommends that countries 
limit interest deductions to anywhere from 10 to 30 percent of EBITDA, 
because a number of countries have in practice enacted 30-percent 
limitations, the OECD recommendation often is perceived as a 30-
percent limitation.
59
See pp. 385-392 of H.R. Conf. Report No. 466, note 51 above.
60
See PwC, “France – Corporate Group Taxation.”
61
European Union, Council Directive (EU) 2016/1164 (establishing 
rules against tax avoidance) (July 12, 2016).
62
Republic of South Africa, Income Tax Act (revised) section 23M. See 
generally Alexandra Readhead, “Preventing Base Erosion: South Africa’s 
Interest Limitation Rules,” Natural Resource Governance Institute 
(2017).
63
OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation — Interim 
Report 2018” (Mar. 16, 2018), at 117.
64
Action 4 report at 49.
65
A 2017 study concludes that the introduction of a limitation in 
Finland, based in part on approximately 25 percent of EBITDA, has been 
effective in raising revenues. Jarkko Harju, Ilpo Kauppinen, and Olli 
Ropponen, “Firm Responses to an Interest Barrier: Empirical Evidence,” 
Working Paper, VATT Institute for Economic Research (2017).
66
For discussion of this topic, see Peter A. Barnes, “Limiting Interest 
Deductions,” in United Nations Handbook on Selected Issues in Protecting 
the Tax Base of Developing Countries (2d ed. 2017), at 179 ff.
For more Tax Notes International content, please visit www.taxnotes.com. 
 
©
 2018 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim
 copyright in any public dom
ain or third party content.
FIRST LOOK
TAX NOTES INTERNATIONAL, JUNE 4, 2018  1173
In view of continuing pressures of tax 
competition, however, it remains an open 
question whether many lower-income country 
governments will choose to adopt EBITDA-based 
limitations on interest deductions. To date, the 
only countries in the developing world to have 
adopted EBITDA-based limitation conforming to 
the new model have been countries that offer 
relatively strong attraction to investors. It also is 
not clear whether, and if so to what extent, the 
effect of the new interest limitations will be offset 
by tax holidays or other tax exemptions. 
Nevertheless, the growing global acceptance of 
EBITDA-based limitations, their relative 
simplicity of administration, and their limited but 
still significant effects on the volume of base 
erosion all suggest that at least some lower-
income countries might find the limitations both 
politically feasible and capable of raising 
worthwhile amounts of additional revenue. 
Chapter 5 of this book will consider how lower-
income countries might incorporate EBITDA-
based interest deduction limitations into a broad 
approach to the control of base erosion and profit 
shifting.
Income Tax Treaties and Withholding Taxes
Introduction
Chapter 3 offered an overview of the 
development of the now-global institution of 
bilateral income tax treaties, under the auspices 
first of the League of Nations after World War I, 
and then of both the OECD and the United 
Nations since World War II. Income tax treaties 
address a very wide range of tax issues that arise 
when individuals or companies conduct cross-
border activities. Thus, virtually all the BEPS 
Action Items have some connection with the topic 
of income tax treaties.67
Procedural Aspects of Tax Treaties
For example, income tax treaties typically 
provide for exchanges of taxpayer information 
between countries’ tax administrations for 
enforcement purposes, and they also establish 
procedures by which the tax authorities of 
different countries can consult with one another 
to protect companies from double taxation arising 
from inconsistent claims by revenue agencies, for 
example in transfer pricing examinations. The 
BEPS reports contain numerous suggestions for 
improving these and other procedural rules in 
bilateral tax treaties.68
‘Permanent Establishment’ Provisions
Other important provisions found in tax 
treaties set forth the circumstances under which a 
country that is party to a treaty is permitted to 
assert taxing jurisdiction over an individual or 
corporate resident of the other party. For example, 
a multinational based in Country A might 
maintain an office in Country B to coordinate the 
local sales of the multinational’s products. If 
Countries A and B have entered into an income 
tax treaty, the treaty will typically contain 
provisions determining whether the local office is 
substantial enough (in terms of, for example, 
whether local personnel have authority to bind 
the parent company contractually) to permit 
Country B to tax income attributable to the office’s 
activities.
A local presence of a foreign taxpayer that is 
substantial enough to subject the taxpayer to local 
income taxation is called, in tax treaties, a 
“permanent establishment.” It has become widely 
acknowledged in recent years that, in part 
because it has become easier to conduct business 
operations remotely by selling products and 
services online, the permanent establishment 
provisions in many bilateral income tax treaties 
can deprive a host country of tax jurisdiction even 
over a foreign multinational that transacts 
substantial local business. The BEPS Action 7 
report recommends that countries revise their tax 
treaties to expand, somewhat, the circumstances 
under which the local operations of a foreign 
company will constitute a permanent 
establishment — for example, by expanding the 
67
For a comprehensive discussion of the many connections between 
the BEPS Action Items and questions related to international tax treaties, 
see Yariv Brauner, “Treaties in the Aftermath of BEPS,” 41 Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law 973 (2016).
68
Discussion of the procedural aspects of income tax treaties is found 
especially in the Final Reports on BEPS Action 15, “Multilateral 
Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent 
BEPS,” and BEPS Action 14, “Making Dispute Resolution Mechanisms 
More Effective.”
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circumstances in which the solicitation of sales 
orders within a country can give rise to a 
permanent establishment. In addition, a more 
extensive expansion of the permanent 
establishment concept, under which on-line sales 
into a country could create a permanent 
establishment even without a local physical 
presence, is currently under discussion within 
both the OECD and the European Union, and has 
already been adopted by a few countries.69 
Numerous technical and political barriers remain 
before global rules with respect to permanent 
establishments are likely to be fundamentally 
restructured. Over time, however, rules 
expanding the definition of permanent 
establishment, if adopted by lower-income 
countries, might generate meaningful revenue 
increases.
‘Treaty Shopping’ and ‘Withholding Taxes’
One element of the BEPS project’s analysis of 
income tax treaties, dealing with the interrelated 
topics of “treaty shopping” and “withholding 
taxes,” has special importance for lower-income 
countries. Countries around the world have, for 
many decades, imposed taxes on the gross 
amounts of interest, royalties, dividends, and 
sometimes management or other service fees, 
paid by local taxpayers to recipients in other 
countries. These withholding taxes reflect a 
longstanding and widespread view that 
international tax laws tend to assign insufficient 
taxing rights to capital-importing (source) 
countries, and excessive taxing rights to capital-
exporting (residence) countries in which 
investing multinational groups are based. For 
example, under the “mercantilist” paradigm that 
was described in Chapter 3 and still pervades 
international tax laws, the local distribution, 
manufacturing, and service-provider subsidiaries 
of multinational groups, especially in developing 
countries, often end up with low taxable incomes 
after the subsidiaries have deducted payments to 
other group members for management fees, 
interest, and royalties. Withholding taxes are 
intended to move the balance of taxing rights to 
some extent back in the direction of source 
countries.
Withholding taxes are simple in their 
operation, and their potential for mitigating 
profit-shifting from source countries is easy to see. 
Assume, for example, that a country’s tax statutes 
impose a corporate income tax at a rate of 25 
percent and also impose a withholding tax of 20 
percent on outbound payments of interest.70 If a 
local member of a multinational group makes a 
payment of $1,000 to a lender (which might be a 
related party located in a zero- or low-tax 
jurisdiction), deducting the interest for income tax 
purposes will result in a tax reduction of $250. The 
withholding tax will, however, impose a 
corresponding tax cost of $200. The overall loss of 
government revenue from the lending 
arrangement, therefore, will be substantially 
reduced.
If source countries in fact applied withholding 
taxes at substantial rates, they would significantly 
reduce the amount of their revenue losses from 
base erosion and profit shifting. Bilateral income 
tax treaties, however, typically provide for the 
reduction of withholding taxes on different kinds 
of payments to levels much lower than those 
prescribed by countries’ tax statutes. For example, 
whereas two countries might under their 
domestic tax statutes both impose withholding 
taxes on interest, royalties, and dividends at, say, 
a 25-percent statutory rate, they might agree in 
their income tax treaty to reduce that rate to 10 or 
5 percent, or even zero.
The treaty-based reduction or elimination of 
withholding taxes by a country may be 
appropriate if the treaty is not being used by 
companies to facilitate BEPS-style avoidance. In 
that case, the amounts of interest, royalties, and 
service fees that taxpayers are paying generally 
will be limited to economically sensible levels, 
and there should be no need for a withholding tax 
to compensate for the taking of excessive 
deductions. Where BEPS is present, however, the 
deductions taken by taxpayers tend to be at 
higher than economically justifiable levels. For 
69
This topic is discussed in OECD, “Tax Challenges Arising from 
Digitalisation — Interim Report 2018”; and European Commission, 
“Proposal for a Council directive laying down rules relating to the 
corporate taxation of a significant digital presence” (Mar. 21, 2018).
70
A summary of the withholding taxes levied by countries around 
the world can be found at Deloitte, “Global corporate tax and 
withholding tax rates” (2018).
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example, interest deductions might simply be 
manufactured through related-party debt, and 
related-party service fees might be inflated. In 
those circumstances, the imposition of 
withholding taxes at relatively high levels seems 
necessary if substantial losses of tax revenue are 
to be prevented.
Often, however, the pressures of tax 
competition induce countries, particularly in the 
developing world, to agree to tax treaties that 
reduce or eliminate withholding taxes, even when 
the countries are plainly affected by high levels of 
base erosion and profit shifting.71 Thus, over the 
years, developing countries have entered into 
many tax treaties that reduce or eliminate 
withholding taxes, even when the financial cost of 
doing so, in terms of revenues lost to BEPS-style 
tax planning, probably has been high. In light of 
this history, lower-income countries should 
exercise considerable caution in deciding whether 
to enter into tax treaties, especially those that 
would involve substantial reduction or 
elimination of withholding taxes.72
The damage from treaties that reduce or 
eliminate withholding taxes has been magnified 
over the years by the phenomenon of “treaty 
shopping.” Consider, for example, Investco, a 
multinational group headquartered in Country A, 
that wishes to open a manufacturing operation in 
Country B, a lower-income country. Because 
Investco desires to engage in BEPS-style tax 
avoidance in Country B, the company does not 
make its desired investment directly in Country B. 
Instead, Invesco establishes a subsidiary in a zero-
tax country, Country H, which happens to have a 
tax treaty with Country B eliminating 
withholding taxes; and the Country H subsidiary 
serves as the parent for the new manufacturing 
subsidiary in Country B.
Under the envisioned planning structure, 
substantial payments of interest and royalties are 
to be made from Investco’s new subsidiary in 
Country B to the holding company in Country H. 
Country B, under its generally applicable tax 
statute, imposes a 25-percent withholding tax on 
outbound payments of interest and royalties, 
which could substantially offset Country B’s 
revenue losses from Investco’s BEPS-style tax 
planning. The income tax treaty that is in effect 
between Countries B and H, however, exempts 
the payments made from Country B to Country H 
from withholding taxes. A situation like this is 
said to involve “treaty shopping” because the real 
beneficiary of the withholding exemption, 
Investco, is a resident of Country A, which is not 
a party to the treaty between Countries B and H. 
Treaty shopping in order to reduce or eliminate 
withholding taxes is common in tax planning 
around the world.73
The OECD’s BEPS reports identify treaty 
shopping as a substantial contributor to base 
erosion and profit shifting, and the OECD has 
initiated an ambitious plan to introduce a new 
Multilateral Instrument (MLI) which would, in 
effect, substitute for the thousands of bilateral tax 
treaties now in effect around the world. The 
centerpiece of the MLI consists of an anti-treaty 
shopping rule, which would permit countries to 
deny treaty benefits, including exemptions from 
withholding tax, to taxpayers that are engaged in 
triangular treaty-shopping efforts with a 
“principal purpose” of avoiding taxes.74
More than 100 countries, at all levels of 
economic development, have signed the MLI, 
expressing at least symbolic support for its 
71
A quantitative study of treaty-negotiation outcomes involving 
lower-income countries is provided by Martin Hearson, “Measuring Tax 
Treaty Negotiation Outcomes: The ActionAid Tax Treaties Dataset,” 
ICTD Working Paper No. 47 (2016).
72
A policy paper of the IMF staff in 2014 advised that “countries 
should not enter treaties lightly—all too often this has been done largely 
as a political gesture—but with close and well-advised attention to the 
risks that may be created.” IMF Policy Paper, “Spillovers in International 
Corporate Taxation” (2014), at 28.
73
The frequency of treaty shopping reflects, in part, that the zero- and 
low-tax jurisdictions that are involved in BEPS planning structures are 
not limited only to tiny island nations scattered around the world. In 
some instances, substantial economic powers like the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Switzerland historically have been willing to allow 
multinationals to use their jurisdictions as zero- or low-tax jurisdictions 
in BEPS-style planning, especially for transactions involving royalties 
and interest payments, and these countries have substantial tax treaty 
networks extending around the world. See, e.g., Mark P. Keightley, “An 
Analysis of Where American Companies Report Profits: Indications of 
Profit Shifting,” U.S. Congressional Research Service (2013) (examining 
apparently large volumes of profit shifting by members of U.S.-owned 
multinational groups to affiliates in Bermuda, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Switzerland).
74
The text of the MLI, and various discussion documents pertaining 
to it, are available online. The MLI offers countries the option of 
adopting language more stringent than the mere “principal purpose” 
test to control treaty shopping, including a detailed “limitation of 
benefits” test modeled after language that the United States has used in a 
number of its treaties. See generally Brauner, note 67 above, at 1004-1006. 
Relatively few countries, however, are likely to adopt the U.S.-style 
language.
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provisions. Before the MLI comes into effect, 
however, pairs of countries must formally 
indicate their desire to be bound by its terms; and 
participating countries also must ratify the 
instrument through legislative action. Despite the 
large number of countries that have indicated 
initial approval of the MLI by signing it, it remains 
uncertain whether the procedural steps needed to 
bind a large number of country pairs to the MLI 
will be taken.75
Moreover, the “principal purpose” test that in 
most cases will control treaty shopping under the 
MLI is factually vague, and tax administrations 
may encounter substantial practical difficulties in 
attempting to apply it. Overall, it is unclear 
whether the BEPS recommendations will, in 
practice, lead to substantial reductions in the 
frequency of treaty shopping.
Base Protection Measures That Countries Have 
Taken Outside the Scope of the BEPS Reports
Diverted Profits Taxes
Some relatively wealthy countries have, in 
recent years, enacted new protections to protect 
their own corporate tax bases from erosion, which 
fall outside the recommendations of the BEPS 
reports. For example, both the United Kingdom 
and Australia have enacted “diverted profits 
taxes” (DPTs) which essentially disallow 
deductions taken from the enacting countries in 
connection with BEPS-style planning strategies.76 
The U.K. and Australian DPTs have attracted a 
good deal of attention among tax practitioners. 
However, in determining whether profits have 
been inappropriately diverted, both the U.K. and 
Australian DPTs rely heavily on the application of 
a subjective “substance over form” test; therefore, 
the DPTs incorporate at least some of the 
weakness of traditional general anti-avoidance 
rules, which tax administrations typically have 
had difficulty applying. It remains to be seen 
whether the U.K. and Australian DPTs will prove 
substantially effective in controlling BEPS, and 
whether the DPTs offer a legislative model that 
may be useful for lower-income countries.
The U.S. Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax (BEAT)
In late 2017, as part of comprehensive tax 
reform legislation, the United States enacted a 
new “Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax” (BEAT) 
in an effort to curtail profit shifting from the 
United States through the making of deductible 
payments to foreign related parties.77 The BEAT 
requires a United States taxpayer to add back into 
its taxable income most deductible payments, 
including interest expenses, royalties, some 
service-fee payments, and others, made to related 
foreign persons. A 10-percent tax78 is then 
computed on the expanded taxable income, and if 
that amount exceeds the taxpayer’s regular tax 
liability the 10-percent tax is imposed instead of 
the regular tax. The BEAT therefore operates as a 
form of minimum tax on companies engaged in 
cross-border business in the United States.
The apparent intent of the BEAT is to limit the 
extent to which multinational groups can benefit 
from the use of “stripped risk” entities in the 
United States. The BEAT can therefore be seen as 
a protective overlay placed atop the transfer 
pricing rules and interest limitations. Even if the 
deduction of certain amounts is permitted under 
the transfer pricing rules and the interest 
limitations, the BEAT can nevertheless deny some 
of the tax benefit from taking the deductions. 
Enactment of the BEAT can be seen as an 
acknowledgement by the U.S. Congress that 
transfer pricing rules and limitations on interest 
deductions are not in themselves sufficient to 
limit base erosion from the United States to 
acceptable levels, but that an additional back-up is 
needed to strengthen those rules.
As an economic matter, the United States was 
able to enact the BEAT because of the strong 
market power that the country enjoys as a 
destination for investment. Lower-income 
countries, which are likely to be much more 
beholden than the United States to pressures of 
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See Lee A. Sheppard, “Latin America and the MLI,” Tax Notes Int’l, 
July 3, 2017, p. 7 (“Signing the MLI is like a dating service — a lot of 
work, a lot of dashed expectations, and no joy”).
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See generally Shinasa Wasimi, Jai Nario, and Kathryn Bertram, 
“Diverted Profits Tax: U.K, Australian, and New Zealand Approaches,” 
Tax Notes Int’l, July 24, 2017, p. 349.
77
The Base Erosion Minimum Tax is contained in a new Section 59A 
of the Internal Revenue Code, and is described in H.R. Conf. Report No. 
466, note 51 above, at 653-660.
78
The tax is phased in, with a 5-percent rate applying in 2018. The 
rate is scheduled to rise to 12.5 percent in 2025.
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tax competition, may be hesitant to follow the U.S. 
example for fear of suppressing inbound 
investment. Moreover, the U.S. BEAT is 
administratively demanding, counseling against 
its application in lower-income countries without 
substantial modification. Nevertheless, the new 
tax is intriguing; and Chapter 5 will offer 
discussion of how a minimum-tax overlay that is 
administratively simpler than the U.S. BEAT 
might be applied effectively in the lower-income 
country setting.
The Overall Legacy of the BEPS Studies for 
Lower-Income Countries
Incrementalism vs. Systemic Transformation
The BEPS process arose from substantial 
public anger toward corporate tax avoidance in 
the aftermath of the Financial Crisis. In response 
to these political pressures, statements of the 
OECD and G-20 early in the BEPS process 
promised a thorough revisiting of the existing 
structure of international tax rules, aimed at 
sharply curtailing profit-shifting by 
multinationals to corporate affiliates in low- and 
zero-tax jurisdictions.79 In particular, in 
emphasizing the goal of aligning the division of 
income among a group’s members with their 
relative contributions to value creation, the early 
OECD and G-20 statements hinted at willingness 
to re-examine the basic tenets of arm’s-length 
transfer pricing rules, under which groups are 
able to steer income toward affiliates in zero- and 
low-tax countries through intragroup contracts, 
even when the affiliates perform little if any 
physical business activity.80 If the BEPS process 
had in fact resulted in fundamentally revised 
transfer pricing rules, which firmly established 
the principle of proportionality between a 
company’s business activities and the income that 
can be attributed to it, BEPS-style tax planning 
would have been dealt a serious and perhaps even 
fatal blow.
Fundamental systemic change, however, was 
never realistically on the table during the BEPS 
process.81 Popular political pressures required the 
G-20 and OECD to use ambitious language in the 
BEPS process’s early stages; but BEPS-style tax 
planning was and remains deeply embedded in 
the structuring of virtually all multinational 
business activity around the world. Base erosion 
and profit shifting have long stood at the center of 
a global political equilibrium under which 
companies’ effective tax rates are constrained, in 
practice, at levels far below the rates stated in 
countries’ tax statutes.
Even in view of the political pressures that 
arose from the 2008 Crisis, upsetting this 
equilibrium in favor of markedly higher effective 
rates would have been politically unacceptable to 
governments of both capital-exporting and 
capital-importing countries. Highly effective 
constraints on BEPS would in effect have forced 
capital-exporting countries to tax their home-
based multinationals at levels that many would 
have seen as unduly discouraging outbound 
investment, and similarly would have compelled 
capital-importing countries to tax inbound 
investment at levels that many in those countries 
would consider as excessive.
Rather than recommendations for 
fundamental systemic change, therefore, the 
BEPS process has suggested incremental 
measures that governments might adopt to 
protect their tax bases from erosion, generally to 
modest extents. The decisions whether to adopt 
these measures, and how vigorously to enforce 
them, are left to each country. To date, it appears 
that the world’s wealthier countries, which 
79
The OECD’s 2013 Action Plan, note 14 above at 14, declared that 
“Fundamental changes [to international tax rules] are needed to 
effectively prevent double non-taxation, as well as cases of no or low 
taxation associated with practices that artificially segregate taxable 
income from the activities that generate it.” In a similar vein, the 2013 St. 
Petersburg Declaration of the G-20, note 8 above at paragraph 50, said:
In a context of severe fiscal consolidation and social hardship, in 
many countries ensuring that all taxpayers pay their fair share of 
taxes is more than ever a priority. Tax avoidance, harmful practices 
and aggressive tax planning have to be tackled. The growth of the 
digital economy also poses challenges for international taxation. 
We fully endorse the ambitious and comprehensive Action Plan — 
originated in the OECD — aimed at addressing base erosion and 
profit shifting with mechanism to enrich the Plan as appropriate. 
We welcome the establishment of the G20/OECD BEPS project and 
we encourage all interested countries to participate. Profits should 
be taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are 
performed and where value is created. In order to minimize BEPS, 
we call on member countries to examine how our own domestic 
laws contribute to BEPS and to ensure that international and our 
own tax rules do not allow or encourage multinational enterprises 
to reduce overall taxes paid by artificially shifting profits to low-tax 
jurisdictions.
80
Notes 11-17 above and accompanying text.
81
Cf. generally Thomas Rixen, “From Double Tax Avoidance to Tax 
Competition,” 2010 Review of International Political Economy 1.
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perceive themselves as relatively insulated from 
pressures of tax competition, and where local 
political sentiment opposing corporate profit-
shifting remains substantial, are more likely to 
adopt the BEPS recommendations, or other base-
protection measures, than are the world’s lower-
income countries.
Some of the measures taken by relatively 
wealthy countries in the aftermath of the BEPS 
reports — including, as discussed above, the 
strengthened CFC rules envisioned under the 
EU’s Anti-Tax Avoidance Directive, and the U.S. 
GILTI tax — might have the spillover effect of 
mitigating the pressures of base erosion on lower-
income countries. Similarly, revised transfer 
pricing rules around the world, modeled on the 
OECD’s new “control of risk” test, might reduce 
global demand for BEPS-style tax planning, 
thereby reducing base-erosion pressures on 
lower-income countries. Efforts by the European 
Union to discourage the use of EU countries as 
zero- or low-tax jurisdictions also could reduce 
demand for BEPS-style planning.
The quantitative extent of any spillover effects 
of these kinds, however, is unknown, and is likely 
to remain so for some time. Overall, it seems likely 
that whatever mitigating effects they might have, 
measures like enhanced CFC rules, the U.S. GILTI 
tax, and revised transfer pricing rules 
incorporating the control-of-risk test will fall far 
short of eliminating the attractiveness of BEPS-
style planning among the world’s multinationals. 
Therefore, if lower-income countries are to raise 
corporate tax revenues to or near desirable levels, 
they will need to do more than rely on spillover 
effects from actions taken by other countries; they 
will instead need to adopt base protection 
measures of their own, suitable to their political 
and economic circumstances.
The next chapter of this book, Chapter 5, will 
suggest particular base-protection measures that 
lower-income countries might adopt in the 
aftermath of the BEPS process. These include some 
of the BEPS recommendations in the areas of 
interest deduction limitations and the 
improvement of administrative practices under 
transfer pricing rules. In addition, extending 
beyond the boundaries of the BEPS 
recommendations, Chapter 5 will recommend that 
lower-income countries give serious consideration 
to the adoption of corporate minimum taxes of a 
kind conceptually similar to, but administratively 
much simpler than, the U.S. BEAT. Corporate 
minimum taxes of this kind already are in effect in 
a number of developing countries, and their 
expanded use might provide meaningful revenue 
enhancements under countries’ existing corporate 
income tax systems. 
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